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Abstract Design of the user interface for authentica-
tion systems inuences users and may encourage ei-
ther secure or insecure behaviour. Using data from four
dierent but closely related click-based graphical pass-
word studies, we show that user-selected passwords vary
considerably in their predictability. Our post-hoc anal-
ysis looks at click-point patterns within passwords and
shows that PassPoints passwords follow distinct pat-
terns. Our analysis shows that many patterns appear
across a range of images, thus motivating attacks which
are independent of specic background images. Con-
versely, Cued Click-Points (CCP) and Persuasive Cued
Click-Points (PCCP) passwords are nearly indistinguish-
able from those of a randomly-generated simulated dataset.
These results provide insight on modeling eective pass-
word spaces and on how user interface characteristics
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lead to more (or less) security resulting from user be-
haviour.
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1 Introduction
Users tend to select predictable passwords and tend
to reuse passwords across dierent accounts. This oc-
curs partially because users are unaware of what makes
a secure password and partially as a coping strategy
since users must remember an ever-increasing number
of passwords. Studies have shown that most user-selected
passwords suer from this problem, including text pass-
words created with dierent strategies [11,17,22] and
various graphical password schemes [8,10,23,25].
A password scheme has both a full theoretical pass-
word space and an eective password space. The full
theoretical password space includes all possible pass-
words, while the eective password space includes only
the subset of passwords likely chosen by users of the
system. Ideally, we want the eective password space
to be as close as possible to the full theoretical pass-
word space.
To better understand eective password spaces and
the characteristics of user interfaces that can inuence
users towards more secure behaviour, we analyzed datasets
collected through user studies of three dierent variants
of click-based graphical passwords and compared them
to a randomly-generated simulated dataset. The simu-
lated dataset represents passwords that would occur if
all passwords were equally likely and thus used the full
theoretical password space. We chose to examine click-
based graphical passwords because they allow for clear
comparisons of user choice, and can provide a simple2
platform on which to test novel design ideas. Our goal
is not to criticize or advocate for specic click-based
password schemes, but to use them as an investigative
tool. Our analysis is not driven by specic hypotheses,
but rather by exploratory post-hoc questions aiming to
identify patterns in click-points, and distinguish their
presence in the dierent variant schemes. Our ndings
can inform the design of other authentication systems,
such as applying them to text passwords.
In this paper, we take a closer look at the types
of patterns that occur in click-based graphical pass-
words and show that in some cases, these occur re-
gardless of the background image. Our main objective
is to study the dierences in user choice of passwords
between three click-based graphical password schemes,
as a function of the dierent user interfaces presented
by these schemes. Our results are based on user stud-
ies conducted in a laboratory, under identical condi-
tions, where dierences in user choice can attributed
to dierences in the user interface. Obviously, patterns
in user choice reduce the eective password space. We
show that the design of the interface impacts whether
users select their click-points in predictable patterns
and that the security of passwords can be improved
through interface design choices. In fact, we show that
for user-selected click-points in Cued Click-Points [6]
and Persuasive Cued Click-Points [4], the click-point
patterns are nearly indistinguishable from randomly se-
lected click-points with respect to the metrics examined
in this paper. We suspect that the dierences compared
to PassPoints [27,28] are due to design choices such as
providing one-to-one cued recall to aid in memorability
and dividing the password selection process into several
independent tasks.
From our results, we note that design choices which
subtly alter user selection of passwords cannot be made
naively because they may weaken security. These design
choices may lead users to employ coping mechanisms,
may make it too easy to make insecure choices, or may
make the insecure option most logical or most conve-
nient from a user's perspective.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Sections 2 and 3 provide background on user-selected
passwords and introduce the click-based graphical pass-
word systems corresponding to the datasets analyzed in
this paper. Our data analysis is described in Section 4.
The paper concludes with discussion of how the design
of the user interface can impact both the usability and
security of the password scheme.
2 Background
In investigating the security of an authentication sys-
tem, its usability must also be evaluated since it can
signicantly impact the real-world security of the sys-
tem. User interface design decisions may sway user be-
haviour, sometimes towards less secure behaviour. This
may be a direct result of the particular interface, or may
be compounded by external inuences. Often, the eas-
iest way of using a system is also the least secure way.
An example of this would be choosing very short, sim-
ple text passwords as opposed to longer, more complex
sequences of characters.
Users must select and remember passwords to pro-
tect an ever-increasing number of accounts. Systems
sometimes provide on-screen advice on how to create
more secure passwords (e.g., select something memo-
rable that would be dicult for others to guess), give
feedback about password choice (e.g., with a password
strength meter), or force users to create passwords that
comply with specic system-dened rules (e.g., the pass-
word must include both letters and numbers). Despite
these strategies, users often select weak passwords. This
occurs partially because users misunderstand the ad-
vice or requirements, underestimate the risks, and be-
cause limitations of human memory mean that they
must employ coping mechanisms in order to reduce the
burden of remembering so many passwords. These cop-
ing mechanisms may include reusing passwords across
several accounts, using predictable alphanumeric com-
binations, or storing passwords in an easily accessible,
insecure location.
Alternatives to text password systems have also been
shown to result in predictable passwords. Davis et al.'s
PassFaces [8, 18] study revealed that when given the
task of selecting a set of facial images for their password,
user choices followed obvious patterns (e.g., attractive
females of their own race). Draw-A-Secret (DAS) [16]
passwords consist of drawing a free-form picture onto
a grid. Users of DAS favoured symmetrical sketches in
several user studies [10,23,25]. A modication named
BDAS [10] introduces a background image to a DAS
system and early results show that this may lead to
less symmetrical passwords; a closer look at patterns
remains to be undertaken.
3 Click-based graphical passwords
Based on Blonder's original idea [1], PassPoints (PP) [27,
28] is a click-based graphical password system where
a password consists of an ordered sequence of 5 click-
points on a pixel-based image (Figure 1). To log in, a
user must click within some system-dened tolerance3
Fig. 1: On PassPoints, a password consists of 5 ordered click-
points on the image (the numbered labels do not appear in prac-
tice). Background image reprinted from [12].
region for each click-point. The image acts as a cue to
help users remember their password click-points. Ear-
lier studies [5, 27, 28] show that PassPoints is usable
both in lab and eld settings. However, it has also been
shown [5,9,14,24] that some areas of the images are
more popular among users, forming hotspots (areas of
the image more likely to be selected by users for their
click-points). Attackers can determine likely hotspots
by gathering sample passwords on an image or through
automated image processing techniques, and then use
these to build an attack dictionary of likely passwords.
Both these methods have had success at cracking some
passwords [9, 24]. Furthermore, Golot [14] manually
categorized dierent areas of three images based on
prominent features (e.g., at, structural, commonplace,
block edges) and shows that user-selected click-points
cluster within the areas of the images categorized as
\commonplace" or \block edge" based on his classi-
cation scheme. In parallel work, Salehi-Abari et al. [21]
recently found that automated dictionary attacks where
click-points are ordered according to horizontal or ver-
tical lines, or general diagonal direction, were successful
on PassPoints passwords.
Since PassPoints showed promise as a usable sys-
tem, we decided to further explore the area. Cued Click-
Points (CCP) [6] was developed as an alternative click-
based graphical password scheme where users select one
point per image for 5 images (Figure 2). The interface
displays only one image at a time; the image is replaced
by the next image as soon as a user selects a click-point.
The system determines the next image to display based
on the user's click-point on the current image. The next
image displayed to users is based on a deterministic
function of the point which is currently selected. This
modied design has several security and usability ben-
Fig. 2: With CCP, users select one click-point per image. The
next image displayed is determined by the current click-point.
ets. It now presents a one-to-one cued recall scenario
where each image triggers the user's memory of the one
click-point on that image. Secondly, if a user enters an
incorrect click-point during login, the next image dis-
played will also be incorrect. Legitimate users who see
an unrecognized image know that they made an error
with their previous click-point. Conversely, this implicit
feedback is not helpful to an attacker who does not
know the expected sequence of images. A lab-based user
study [6] showed CCP had similar usability to Pass-
Points, but showed that although hotspots are slightly
less likely to occur in CCP than PassPoints, they do still
occur. The advantage is that there are now hundreds or
thousands (depending on system conguration) of im-
ages that attackers must rst acquire and analyze indi-
vidually as they do not know which images belong to
a user's password. This increases the eort needed to
mount an attack compared to one image for PassPoints.
To address the issue of hotspots, Persuasive Cued
Click-Points (PCCP) was proposed [4]. As with CCP,
a password consists of 5 click-points, one on each of 5
images. During password creation, most of the image is
dimmed except for a small viewport area that is ran-
domly positioned on the image (Figure 3). Users must
select a click-point within the viewport. If they are un-
able or unwilling to select a point in the current view-
port, they may press the Shue button to randomly
reposition the viewport. The viewport guides users to
select more random passwords that are less likely to
include hotspots. A user who is determined to reach
a certain click-point may still shue until the view-
port moves to the specic location, but this is a time-
consuming and more tedious process. In eect, PCCP
makes selecting a stronger password the \path-of-least-
resistance" because choosing from the rst oered view-
port is quickest and simplest, as well as most random.
The system does not rigorously constrain user choice,
but makes it more dicult to behave insecurely. The
viewport is only applied during password creation; sub-
sequent logins operate the same as CCP. This feature
may be compared to password policies for text pass-4
words, but they dier on an important point: if a text
password policy requires a symbol, the user is obliged to
include a symbol within the password and cannot pro-
ceed until the requirement is met. With PCCP, users
are free to select any click-point on the image, but the
system encourages users to select a click-point from the
rst (or rst few) viewport positions. Our user study [4]
indicates most users do follow the systems' suggestions
in this way, and that users are still able to recall their
resulting passwords. We found that PCCP signicantly
reduced the appearance of hotspots and had click-point
clustering levels approaching that of a random distribu-
tion.
Fig. 3: The PCCP password creation interface. Users must select
a click-point from the randomly-positioned highlighted viewport
or press the Shue button to randomly reposition the viewport.
In separately reported work, we conducted user stud-
ies on each of the click-based graphical passwords dis-
cussed above. Lab studies using identical methodology
were done for all three systems [4{6]. These studies
showed that PassPoints, CCP, and PCCP were usable
systems with acceptable memorability and reported on
preliminary security analyses. This current paper an-
alyzes these datasets to further identify dierences in
user choice that may aect security.
3.1 Data Collection
The lab studies of PassPoints, CCP, and PCCP [4{6]
focused on a core set of 17 images. CCP and PCCP
required a larger pool of images, so a set of 330 images
was used, which included the 17 from the core set. We
also manipulated the selection algorithm so that each
user saw all 17 core images.1 To be consistent with the
original PassPoints user studies [27,28], the images were
of size 451  331 pixels, the tolerance region around
click-points was 1919 pixels, and passwords consisted
of 5 click-points.
Users came to the lab for individual 1-hour sessions
during which they completed as many trials as time
permitted. A trial involved creating, conrming, and
logging in with a new password; it consisted of the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Create: Users created a password by clicking on 5
click-points. With PassPoints, these click-points were
on one image; with CCP and PCCP, users saw a se-
quence of 5 images.
2. Conrm: Users conrmed their password by re-entering
their 5 click-points. If they made a mistake, they
had the options of re-trying as many times as they
wished, resetting their password (returning to step
1), or skipping this trial.
3. Questionnaire: Users answered two questions per-
taining to their newly created password, giving their
perception of how easy this password would be to
remember in a week and how easy it was to create
the password.
4. Distraction task: As established in psychology stud-
ies [13], users spent at least thirty seconds complet-
ing an MRT puzzle [19] to simulate a longer passage
of time and to clear visual working memory.
5. Login: Users re-entered their password. They could
retry if they made mistakes, reset their password
(return to step 1), or skip the trial if they were un-
able to remember their password.
Our analysis compares data from our three lab stud-
ies: PassPoints (PP), Cued Click-Points (CCP), and
Persuasive Cued Click-Points (PCCP). Table 1 sum-
marizes the number of participants, passwords, and in-
dividual click-points collected. More points per image
were collected for PassPoints (PP) since each user's
password gave 5 click-points on an image whereas for
CCP and PCCP, there was only one click-point per im-
age.
1 This weighted image selection algorithm was not in place for
the rst few CCP participants. The system displayed random
images and users may not have seen all 17 core images. This was
modied for later participants of CCP and was in place for all of
PCCP participants.5
Table 1: Number of participants, click-points, and passwords per lab study. Note that only passwords where users were successfully
able to conrm and login are used in our analysis and included in this table.
Number of Total number Total number
Study participants of click-points of passwords
PassPoints (PP) 43 2800 560
CCP 57 2520 504
PCCP 39 1500 300
For PassPoints, we also previously conducted a eld
study (PPField) [5] where 191 participants used a web-
based PassPoints system for accessing their class notes
for 7-9 weeks. Two images, Pool and Cars (Figures 12a
and 12b), were selected from the core set for use in the
eld study because they had performed well during lab
testing. We collected 116 passwords (580 click-points)
on the Pool image and 109 passwords (545 click-points)
on the Cars image. In some cases, we collected more
than one password per user because users were allowed
to change their password during the semester.
Besides analyzing the datasets for patterns, we wanted
to see whether the datasets diered from randomly-
generated datasets. For this, we used a modied Monte-
Carlo approach of generating simulations. For each study
(PP, CCP, PCCP, PPField), we generated 100 sim-
ulated datasets, each containing the same number of
passwords as the corresponding original dataset. Each
password consisted of 5 pairs of (x,y) coordinates, cor-
responding to 5 click-points. These simulated datasets
approximate passwords taken from the full theoretical
password space, where all passwords are equally proba-
ble. They were generated using R's [15] random number
generator function for uniform distributions (runif()).
In the present paper, we are using these datasets
to explore a new question: how does user interface de-
sign aect security in these similar graphical password
schemes, and what patterns of user choice emerge as a
result of the dierent interfaces?
4 Analysis of User Choice
Patterns in user choice reduce the eective password
space and are advantageous to attackers who can use
this knowledge to modify their attack strategy and in-
crease the likelihood of success. Previous studies [4,9,14,
24,26] show that when attackers know the images used
to create passwords, they can determine likely hotspots
and use this information to successfully attack Pass-
Points and CCP passwords. In the following sections
we show that, surprisingly, patterns emerge even with-
out knowing the images. We look at several dierent
password characteristics to see which ones reveal pat-
terns that could help attackers ne-tune their attack
strategy.
We focus mainly on data from the lab studies be-
cause the methodologies are the same and the studies
cover a wide range of images, reducing the risk of get-
ting results that are an artifact of a particular image. In
the following analysis, data from the three lab studies
(PassPoints, CCP, and PCCP) are examined and com-
pared against the randomly-generated datasets. The
number of passwords and individual click-points for each
dataset is available in Table 1. Unless otherwise indi-
cated, all analyses of PassPoints refers to the dataset
from the lab study (not the eld study also mentioned
in Section 3.1).
For each measure in the following analysis, we also
calculated the results for each of the simulated datasets.
We then determined the maximum and minimum me-
dian values among the 100 simulated datasets corre-
sponding to a given study. These minima and maxima
indicate the range of random values. There is a 99%
probability that any collected result falling outside of
this range did not occur by chance. This is because each
simulation represents a chance to include the observed
value. If this does not happen after 100 simulations,
this suggests that there is less than one chance in 100
that it might do so at random. Therefore if median val-
ues for our real datasets fall outside of this minimum-
maximum range, it is likely because some pattern exists
in the dataset that did not occur by chance. In all of the
subsequent gures, we have represented these minima
and maxima as lines, to more clearly observe patterns,
but the data is not continuous.
Three additional standard statistical tests are used
in analyzing whether dierences in the data reect ac-
tual dierences between conditions or whether these
may have occurred by chance. In all cases, a value for
p < :05 signies that the groups being tested are dier-
ent from each other with at least 95% probability, mak-
ing the result statistically signicant. Fisher's F test
compares variance of the means between more than two
groups. In F(a;b), a represents the between-groups de-
grees of freedom (df) and b indicates the within-groups
df. T-tests are used to compare the variance of the
means between two groups. In t(c), c represents the6
df. If the df for a t-test includes a decimal point, it
is because Levene's Test indicated that equal variances
could not be assumed, and so a Welch Two-Sample t-
test was used instead. Chi-square tests (2) compare
the probability distributions of two or more samples
of non-ordered categorical data. In 2(d;N = e), the
d represents the df and e provides the sample size. In
all cases we show the relevant statistic, and then the
p-value that it indicates.
In post-hoc analysis, it is important to avoid the
misleading situation where many directions are pur-
sued, but only those which lead to signicant results
are reported. Although we omit the precise statistical
test values and p-values for insignicant results, we re-
port on all of our pattern investigations, regardless of
their results.
4.1 Click-point distribution
Are click-points distributed in some recognizable man-
ner independent of the background image? We found
that when selecting 5 click-points on a single image (as
in PassPoints), users tend to select their rst point to-
wards the top-left of the image and progressively move
towards the bottom-right with each subsequent click-
point. This was not the case when users only selected
one click-point per image (as per CCP and PCCP).
Figure 4 shows the distribution of click-points along
the x-axis of the image.2 The origin (0,0) is at the
bottom-left of the image. The box plots represent the
original datasets, while the blue and red lines respec-
tively represent the minimum and maximum median
values for the random simulations. As explained in Sec-
tion 4, if the medians for the real datasets fall out-
side of the lines, then this pattern did not occur by
chance with 99% probability. With PassPoints, there
is a clear progression from the left side of the image
for the rst click-point towards the right for fth click-
point (see Figure 4). The same occurs for the y-axis,
as demonstrated in Figure 5; PassPoints click-points
progress from the top of the image towards the bot-
tom. Note that our participants were volunteers from
an environment where Western (top-down, left-right)
writing and reading is dominant; we suspect that a ten-
dency towards right-to-left or other distributions may
be evident in other cultures. With CCP and PCCP, the
click-points are quite uniformly distributed along both
2 Notched box plots can be interpreted as follows. The thick
line in the narrowest part of the box represents the median. The
box represents the centre quartiles (25th to 75th percentile). The
notches surrounding the median represent the condence inter-
vals. If the notches of two boxes do not overlap, then they are
signicantly dierent from each other at p < :05.
the x- and y-axes, regardless of the click-point num-
ber, as Figures 4 and 5 also illustrate. For PassPoints,
the medians fall outside of the random range for three
of the ve click-points, while all of CCP and PCCP's
medians fall within range of the simulated datasets.
Regression analysis shows that for PassPoints, there
exists a strong relationship between the click-point num-
ber and its position on the x- and y-axes. For the x-axis,
F(4, 2795)=123.7 and p < :0001, and F(4, 2795)=30.2
and p < :0001 for the y-axis. No such relationship exists
for CCP, PCCP, or the simulated datasets.
With PassPoints, it is possible to determine which
areas of the image are more likely to contain click-
points based entirely on the click-point number, with-
out knowledge of the image used. For example, looking
at Figure 4 we see that 75% of the rst click-points
fall within the rst 200 pixels (out of 451 pixels) on
the x-axis. Contrarily, the click-point number is not a
predictor of click-point location for CCP and PCCP.
4.2 Segment lengths
We next looked at the length of the segments formed
between two adjacent click-points. If attackers can pre-
dict the likely distance between click-points, they could
prioritize guesses containing click-points that are ap-
proximately that distance apart.
Figure 6 illustrates the distance in pixels between
adjacent click-points in each dataset. For example, in
PassPoints, the median segment length is 87 pixels while
the median for CCP is 193 pixels. Adjacent click-points
in PassPoints are more closely positioned, with very few
individual segments spanning the entire image. For seg-
ment length, the PassPoints click-point distribution is
statistically dierent from the simulated datasets (t(2288.92)=
45.30, p < :0001)). An attacker may be able to use this
information to predict higher probability click-point com-
binations, again even without knowledge of the specic
image.
On the other hand, CCP segment lengths are more
evenly distributed and are indistinguishable from those
of the simulated datasets. The PCCP dataset, however,
appears distinct from the simulated datasets for seg-
ment lengths (t(1231.89)=14.17, p < :0001). Figure 6
conrms that PCCP segments are shorter (median of
160 pixels) than those of the random sets. We were
surprised by this result and suspect that it may have
occurred as a side-eect of the viewport positioning al-
gorithm, or it may be that users were more likely to
select a click-point towards the center of the viewport
and so the edges of the image were less likely to be
selected.7
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Fig. 4: The box plots show the distribution of click-points along the x-axis of the image, grouped and ordered by click-point number
for the three original datasets. The image dimensions were 451331, therefore 451 is the maximum possible x-coordinate. The red line
(with circles) and the blue line (with triangles) represent the maximum and minimum median values among the simulation datasets,
respectively.
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Fig. 5: The box plots show the distribution of click-points along the y-axis of the image, grouped and ordered by click-point number
for the three original datasets. The image dimensions were 451331, therefore 331 is the maximum possible y-coordinate. The red line
(with circles) and the blue line (with triangles) represent the maximum and minimum median values among the simulation datasets,
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Fig. 6: The box plot shows the distance in pixels between two
adjacent click-points in a password (segment length) for the 3
original datasets. The red line (with circles) and the blue line
(with triangles) represent the maximum and minimum median
values among the simulation datasets, respectively.
We also examined whether the segment number had
any eect on segment length. Segment lengths appear
consistent regardless of their position within the pass-
word (Figure 7). Regression analysis conrmed that
there were no statistically signicant relationships be-
tween segment number and segment length for any of
the datasets.
4.3 Angles and slopes
Users of PassPoints tend to create a straight line with
their click-points, as evidenced in Figure 8.3 The Pass-
Points diagram shows that the most common angles
formed between two line segments are near 0 degrees,
indicating that the users often selected click-points in a
straight line, heading in the same direction. In compar-
ison, CCP, PCCP, and the simulated datasets favour
large angles resulting from back and forth motion be-
tween click-points.
The distribution of segment slopes relative to the x-
axis in PassPoints (Figure 9) shows that users strongly
favour horizontal lines (0 degree slopes), followed by
vertical segments in the downward direction (270 degree
slopes). The slopes for the CCP and PCCP datasets
are quite evenly distributed, which matches the slopes
from the simulated datasets. Of the three systems, only
PassPoints is distinct from the simulated datasets.
We further investigated whether angle number or
slope number had any eect on the angle or slope re-
spectively. We found no evidence of such interaction. In
3 Figures 8, 9, and 16 use circular diagrams to summarize angle
data. These can be interpreted as circular frequency distribution
diagrams. They appear attened due to the rectangular shape of
the images (451331 pixels) from which this data was collected.8
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Fig. 7: The box plots show the segment lengths grouped by segment number for the 3 original datasets. The red line (with circles)
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Fig. 8: Frequency distribution of the angle (in degrees) formed between two adjacent line segments. These line segments are formed
by joining two consecutive click-points in a password. The grey bars and black line represent the original dataset. The red dotted line
and the blue dashed line represent the maximum and the minimum median values among the simulated datasets, respectively.
other words, the likelihood of nding a given angle (or
slope) was not impacted by its ordinal position within
the password.
4.4 Shapes
We also looked at shapes formed by all 5 click-points
and the line segments between adjacent points. Our
classication scheme identied 5 dierent categories of
patterns, as detailed in Table 2 and Figure 10. For ex-
ample, click-points may form a W-shape pattern. A
password was classied into this category if the line
segments formed this particular pattern, regardless of
orientation; a sideways or upside down W was still con-
sidered a W, as illustrated in Figure 10. The password
shapes were identied by following the path formed
from the rst to last click-point sequentially, as entered
by the user.
Once again, we found that the PassPoints dataset
was easily distinguishable from the simulated datasets
(2(5,56560)=6798.67, p < :0001).4 PassPoints includes
simpler shapes, with far more passwords forming lines
and V-shape patterns. Figure 11 reveals how PassPoints
is distinct from CCP, PCCP, and the simulated datasets.
4 The degrees of freedom shown relate to all samples, including
those that were randomly generated.
Chi-square tests revealed no statistically signicant dif-
ference between either of the CCP and PCCP datasets
and their corresponding simulated datasets.
4.5 Analysis of our PassPoints eld study (PPField)
The PassPoints eld study [5], as previously mentioned,
oers an opportunity to look at \real-world" passwords
used over an extended period of time. It provides evi-
dence of the types of passwords that one may expect to
see if such a system was deployed. However since only
two images were used, the patterns may be a direct
result of the Pool (Figure 12a) and Cars (Figure 12b)
images. We present the patterns found, but caution that
further work is required to determine whether these oc-
cur across dierent images as well.
Figure 13 reveals that in the PassPoints eld study,
the click-point number has an eect on the x-coordinates
of the click-points but not on the y-coordinates. The
lack of interaction for the y-axis is likely a result of the
Cars image since users frequently selected their click-
points in a horizontal line across a row of cars. This is
further supported by Figure 14 which shows that 24%
of passwords followed a straight line. A further 17% had
only one bend, forming a V-shape. Figure 16 also shows
users' preference for straight lines since the most popu-9
(a) PassPoints (PP) (b) CCP (c) PCCP
Fig. 9: Frequency distribution of the slope (in degrees) of each line segment, relative to the x-axis. Line segments are formed by
joining two consecutive click-points in a password. The grey bars and black line represent the original dataset. The red dotted line
and the blue dashed line represent the maximum and the minimum median values among the simulated datasets, respectively.
Table 2: Shape classication scheme
Shape Description
Line The sum of the absolute values for all 3 angles is less than 15 degrees.
W Angle 1 and angle 3 have the same sign (turn in the same direction) and angle
2 has the opposite sign.
Z Two of the angles have opposite signs (turn in opposite directions) and the
third angle is less than 15 degrees (forms a straight line).
V Two of the angles are less than 15 degrees and the third angle is greater than
15 degrees.
C All 3 angles have the same sign (turn in the same direction) and the sum of
the absolute values for all 3 angles is greater than 180.
Other Anything that does not fall into the above patterns, i.e.,\no known pattern".
Fig. 10: Examples of the click-point patterns for each category. These represent the path formed by the sequence of points as entered
by the user, proceeding in constant direction from one end of the pattern to the other.
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Fig. 11: The bar graph shows the percentage of passwords that fall into each shape category for the 3 original datasets. The red line
(with circles) and the blue line (with triangles) represent the maximum and minimum median values among the simulation datasets,
respectively.10
(a) The Pool image [20] (b) The Cars image [2]
Fig. 12: Images used in the PassPoints Field (PPField) study
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Fig. 13: The box plots show the distribution of click-points for
the PassPoints eld study along the x- and y-axes of the im-
age, grouped and ordered by click-point number. The image di-
mensions were 451  331, therefore 451 is the maximum possible
x-value and 331 is the maximum y-value. The red line (with cir-
cles) and the blue line (with triangles) represent the maximum
and minimum median values among the simulation datasets, re-
spectively.
lar angles and slopes are very near 0 degrees. The slopes
diagram (Figure 16b) further highlights that users pre-
ferred horizontal or vertical directions, with peaks near
0, 90, 180, and 270 degrees.
The median segment length for the PassPoints eld
study matches the median for the PassPoints lab study
(Figure 15). This shows that even in the eld study,
users still tended to select adjacent click-points in close
proximity to each other.
The PassPoints eld data certainly exhibits click-
point patterns; although some of these may be side-
eects of the Pool and Cars images. We suspect that
they may also be partially attributed to users trying to
select more memorable and simple passwords since they
had to remember PassPoints passwords over a longer
period of time, and because they had to actually use
their passwords on a regular basis to access their class
notes. This serves as further cautionary evidence that
user behaviour tends towards the easiest path when us-
ing authentication systems in a practical setting.
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Fig. 14: The bar graph shows the percentage of passwords that
fall into each shape category for the PassPoints Field study. The
red line (with circles) and the blue line (with triangles) represent
the maximum and minimum median values among the simulation
datasets, respectively.
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Fig. 15: The box plots represent the line segment lengths for the
PassPoints lab (PPLab) and PassPoints eld (PPField) studies.
Line segments are formed by joining two consecutive click-points
in a password. The red line (with circles) and the blue line (with
triangles) represent the maximum and minimum median values
among the simulation datasets, respectively.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Previous studies [5,9,14,24,26] have shown that hotspots
occur in PassPoints and provide some evidence of click-
point patterns [21]. Our present analysis provides con-
siderably more evidence of click-point patterns. Our
analysis revealed that click-point coordinates, segment11
(a) PassPoints Field Angles (b) PassPoints Field Slopes
Fig. 16: Frequency distributions of angles between segments and segment slopes for the PassPoints eld study. There are more data
points in the slopes diagram since each password contains 4 slopes and only 3 angles, making the slopes diagram appear slightly larger
than the angles diagram. The grey bars and black line represent the PPField dataset. The red dotted line and the blue dashed line
represent the maximum and the minimum median values among the simulated datasets, respectively.
Table 3: Summary of hotspots and patterns in click-based
graphical passwords
Measure PP CCP PCCP
Hotspots Yes Yes No
Patterns Yes No No
lengths, angles between segments, segment slopes, and
shapes formed by click-points can all be used to iden-
tify patterns in user passwords when all click-points are
on a single image. Interestingly, these same patterns
were not apparent when click-points within a password
were based on distinct images. For example, users of
PassPoints prefer straight lines, with click-points that
are roughly evenly spaced across the image, starting
from left to right, and either completely horizontal or
sloping from top to bottom. These patterns appeared
across a wide range of images, suggesting that attack-
ers may benet from strategies which attempt to lever-
age the patterns, independent of specic background im-
ages. Conversely, CCP and PCCP do not display these
same patterns and are very similar to the randomly-
generated datasets based on the pattern characteristics
analyzed in this paper. We note that there may ex-
ist other patterns, which we have not examined, and
that dierent results may occur in a long-term usabil-
ity study of CCP and PCCP.
In click-based graphical passwords, hotspot infor-
mation may be combined with knowledge of common
click-point patterns. We expect that knowledge of likely
patterns could be eectively used to prioritize a dic-
tionary of passwords comprised entirely of (or biased
towards) component click-points found to attract at-
tention, e.g., hotspots. As shown in recent work [21], a
dictionary of passwords could also be constructed based
solely on the patterns, without knowledge of the partic-
ular image. Not all images will have the same suscep-
tibility to every type of pattern. However, the patterns
identied are suciently prevalent that attackers try-
ing to launch an automated attack on PassPoints would
have an advantage by prioritizing passwords that follow
the simple patterns identied in this paper. For Pass-
Points, using these patterns will likely give attackers
an advantage even without having to analyze specic
images. Table 3 summarizes the susceptibility of each
scheme to hotspots and patterns.
All three schemes (PassPoints, CCP, and PCCP)
are based on the same fundamental idea that a pass-
word consists of 5 ordered click-points while the image
(or images) acts as a cue to remember the click-points.
Nonetheless, our results indicate important dierences
in usage which lead to patterns that a conservative de-
fender must expect to be exploitable by attackers.
With PassPoints, users receive one image as a cue
and must recall 5 click-points. This may be a more chal-
lenging cognitive task and it may be that users resort to
click-point patterns in an eort to cope. Alternatively,
asking users to select 5 click-points on one image may
simply encourage the creation of patterns because it is
the easiest strategy. If this is the case, the mere fact
that a password consists of 5 clicks on one image leads
to insecure behaviour and design choices such as \what
type of images" become less signicant, since the sys-
tem is inherently less secure.
With CCP and PCCP, each image provides a cue
for the corresponding click-point. The one-to-one rela-
tionship may be easier for users to remember, there-
fore reducing the tendency towards selecting an overall
geometric pattern formed by the click-points. Also, as
each image appears on the screen, it forces users to
refocus and take in the new stimulus which may inter-
rupt the thought process for forming a pattern. PCCP
further tries to persuade users to select more random
points through the viewport, making it much less conve-12
nient to select hotspots. Consequently, the easiest path
is most secure.
Overall, we note that the implications of design choices
need to be carefully considered when making security-
related modications to a graphical password design or
user interface. For example, adding a sixth click-point
to PassPoints may provide less of a security improve-
ment than adding a click-point to PCCP. With Pass-
Points, our results suggest that an extra click-point is
likely to extend an existing click-point pattern, whereas
in PCCP the extra click-point would add considerably
more randomness to the password.
User choice is heavily inuenced by the design of the
system. Previous work focused on how image choice led
to the formation of hotspots. We show that relatively
minor changes in the type of cueing used and feedback
provided by the system can lead to a signicant reduc-
tion in the occurrence of patterns, regardless of image
choice. In the case of click-based graphical passwords, it
appears that having multiple images within a password
is a main factor in reducing patterns in user-selected
passwords. We are currently investigating what paral-
lels exist with text passwords and hope that the in-
sight gained from graphical passwords can be applied
to other types of passwords or usable security systems
in general.
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